Introduction
Social media is a growing existential threat. In the Constitution, We the
People affirm ourselves to domestic tranquility, our common defense and general
welfare to secure the blessings of Liberty.1 As such, statesmen are charged with
developing policy to ensure social media is safe, accessible and usable to all.
Currently, social media companies and use of their platforms pose a threat to
national security and the societal fabric of our nation.
No longer just a communication tool to bring communities and people
together, social media is now leveraged to disrupt and diminish faith in our
democratic republic, its people, systems and institutions. Citizens, public and
private organizations, elected officials, alt-leaning media, etc. are able to write,
share, and spread misleading-to-false information through various social media
platforms without consequence. Social media companies, protected from
liabilities of the intended or unintended effects of information found or shared
over their platforms through various policies and liability protections, are the sole
determinant of content and user reach.
Discussing the Issues
History and Growth of Social Media
The “social media experience” was driven by peoples’ need for
connectedness. These internet-based applications created an online environment
and space to nurture connections, build communities, and create and exchange
user-generated content in a participatory manner.2 For example, Facebook’s
original mission, which evolved slightly in its early years, stated it was a utility to
connect people, create social networks, share with people in your life, build
communities, and make the world more open.3
Yet, what were once viewed as tools to create connections, bridge
networks, and build a more informed world have become digital societies that
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have supplanted mass media as the primary provider of information.4 In this
digitized social world, facts become a matter of opinion, likeminded ideologies
find an echo-chamber to political and social polarization, misinformation or
disinformation stories spread six times faster than real ones, and society becomes
increasingly fractured.5
Additionally, the largest of these companies are now publicly traded,
meaning these platforms are or can become, capitalist enterprises with a singular
goal; make money off users to increase profits for shareholders.6 In fact, as use
becomes easier, and growth and user access expands, more and more Americans
receive their news from social media. At the same time, “social media shatters
unity and divides people, set[ting] them at loggerheads with one another…
mak[ing] direct engagement (and therefore confrontation) between opposing
camps far easier.”7
Platform algorithms are programmed to cluster users based off user data,
profiles, likes, shares and reactions.8 This creates the space to target users with
advertisements, “stories,” or “trending topics” to keep users engaged on the site.9
Revenue growth is directly tied to increased usage, which generates advertising
revenues. “[Social media companies],” as Sarah Kreps, Professor of Government
at Cornell University, writes, “have few incentives to moderate content since
doing so is at odds with a business model that favors sensational content that
attracts and keeps users online.”10
Current Social Media Policies
Current social media policies are designed to promote usage and growth.
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of keeping or attracting users to their platforms. Facebook’s community standards
policy reads:
The goal of our Community Standards has always been to create a place
for expression and give people a voice… We want people to be able to
talk openly about the issues that matter to them, even if some may
disagree or find them objectionable. In some cases, we allow content for
public awareness which would otherwise go against our Community
Standards.11
Similarly, Twitter rules and policies state:
Violence, harassment and other similar types of behavior discourage
people from expressing themselves, diminishing the value of public
conversation. Our rules ensure all people can participate in public
conversation freely and safely… However, we recognize that sometimes it
may be in the public interest to allow people to view Tweets that would
otherwise be taken down.12
Although a number of companies work to remove some users that abuse
their terms of service, their policies maximize interest to keep users engaged and
subject to advertisements.13 Additionally, the number of social media users
relative to content moderators employed by these sites cannot stop dangerous
content from reaching the masses.14 By implementing circumventable policies
around safety, companies ensure an ever-present gateway to dangerous content.
In discussing the policies of social media companies, former diplomat,
CIA analyst and national security expert, Yael Eisenstat states, “the modern
information environment is crystallized around profiling us and then segmenting
us into more and more narrow categories,” bombarding us with information,
“confirming our views, and reinforcing our biases,” which is similar to the tactics
used by terrorist organizations as they work to recruit new members.15 Social
media policies are encroaching upon the ability to think freely and critically.
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The Dangers of Social Media Misuse
There are several examples of social media platforms being used for ill
intent and purpose. Consequently, there are growing instances of users and actors,
empowered by social media and policies permitting their use, causing harm,
injury or damage to individuals, communities and institutions.
•

Foreign Adversaries

The 2016 U.S. Election showed the U.S. is vulnerable to foreign
interference and attack. Studies show that U.S. adversaries are fully capable of
conducting information or irregular warfare and achieving defined objectives.16 In
the weeks leading up to the 2016 election, Twitter found approximately 400,000
bot accounts and concluded that Russian-generated propaganda to influence the
outcome of the election was delivered 452.7 million times to millions of users,
including 2.2 million Tweets from Russia’s Internet Research Agency.17
Russian disinformation operations against the U.S. are not new, however,
with the reach and speed of dissemination through social media, Russia’s ability
to weaponize platforms and create digital battlegrounds degraded public trust and
confidence in democracy, its processes and institutions.18 Former national security
advisor, H. R. McMaster shared, “Russian manipulation was effective because of
social media companies’ business models, and narrow focus on functionality
without consideration for how their platforms could be used for nefarious
purposes,” adding, “the companies’ algorithms do not prioritize truth or accuracy,
but instead help disseminate fake news and disinformation.”19
Following the 2016 election, studies showed social media users were
generally unable to identify online disinformation, which is dangerous as the
purpose of state-sponsored disinformation was to degrade democratic society,
polarize groups, and skew one’s ability to distinguish between fact and fiction.20 It
can then be deduced, foreign actors such as Russia, leveraging the
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“nonintervention” policies of social media, harnessed the power of social media to
inflict significant damage on American society.21 Damage still being felt today.
•

Domestic Extremist

The Center for Strategic and International Studies published that although
global terrorism dropped 50% between 2014-2019, terrorist attacks in the U.S.
increased 141% during the same period and is likely to increase as Americans
become more polarized.22 The study also highlights, “most domestic extremist use
the internet and social media platforms to release propaganda, coordinate training,
raise funds, recruit members, and communicate with others,” placing the nation at
great risks as U.S.-based extremist groups continue to expand their reach through
the use of digital platforms.23
During the first seven month of 2020, right-wing and left-wing groups
were responsible for 87% of the terrorist plots or attacks in the U.S.24 A recent
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Bulletin finds that although domestic,
or ideologically-motived extremists primarily targeted individuals with opposing
views through First Amendment-protected and non-violent protest activities, it
details many cases where such protests led to violence and harm against
individuals and structures.25 As a result, DHS issued a nationwide terrorism alert
on January 27, 2021, warning of a heightened threat of domestic attacks.26
In the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ analysis of these attacks and
activities, they share that social media platforms are facilitating the ability of
domestic extremists or similar hate groups to reach, radicalize and recruit
individuals receptive to polarizing messaging, which can be leveraged to mobilize
individuals for violent responses to meet group objectives.27 Like foreign
adversaries, domestic extremists are not using these platforms to build better
communities. They use them to create division, distrust and fracture society.
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•

Individual Anxieties and Distrust

In addition to foreign adversaries and domestic extremists being able to
reach and negatively influence the U.S. population, other topics have proven to be
equally at risk of disinformation campaigns. A protest-turned-riot in Washington
D.C. on January 6, 2021, provides the most recent example of how social media
can be used to disinform and polarize individuals, proving detrimental to the
safety and wellbeing of Americans and the nation.
On January 6, 2021, during a joint session of Congress to certify the
Electoral College vote for President of the United States, a non-violent protest
quickly escalated into a violent breach of the Capitol Building, leading to five
deaths, millions of dollars in damages, 150+ arrest and over 400 suspects of
various crimes.28 Arguably worse, this protest demonstrated that social media
plays a very active role in determining whether or not these actions can occur.
Social media platforms permitted influential personalities to share and to
spread misinformation about voter fraud, elevating distrust in the electoral process
for a large percentage of Americans.29 As distrust, animosity and false claims
spread through these platforms, key figures leveraged social media to mobilize
individuals and groups to protest against a legal election process.
In the weeks after the riot, multiple affidavits filed by federal investigators
note social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Parler, etc. were used to
openly coordinate the protest, to incite violence and unlawful entry into the
Capitol Building, and to obstruct with subsequent law enforcement
investigations.30
Research and analysis of whether individual users should be held
accountable for events before, during and after the riot at the Capitol Building is
for another discussion. However, false and misleading information continues to
spread through social media, festering individual anxieties, creating distrust in one
another and in U.S. institutions. The issue is not just that American society is
being fractured by misinformation and disinformation being spread through social
media, it is also that social media companies have almost exclusive control of
content reach.
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Responding to the Issues
Responses from within the Industry
Social media companies have taken some action following recent events.
Multiple social media platforms banned influential personalities for their alleged
roles in the events surrounding the riot at the U.S. Capitol Building. Following the
ban, preliminary data suggest that online misinformation on election fraud
dropped 73%.31 Twitter launched a “community-driven forum called ‘Birdwatch’
that’s meant to combat misinformation and disinformation on the site,” allowing
users to add context to information believed to be misleading.32 Social media
application hosting sites, such as Apple, Amazon and Google, removed social
media platforms, such as Parler, for not doing enough to moderate content inciting
violence or threating safety.33
In a 2018 testimony before the Senate, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg
stated, “I don’t want anyone to use our tools to undermine democracy; that’s not
what we stand for.”34 Regardless of Zuckerberg’s or other industry leaders’ stated
positions, many social media companies continue to enact policies and procedures
of nonintervention, with some justifying their minimalist approach “on the basis
of a narrow interpretation of freedom of expression, while ignoring the numerous
harms, such as harassment, hate speech, voter suppression, and violence.”35
Recently, Facebook’s own internal oversight board overturned Facebook’s
decision to remove posts that had been removed for violations of its Community
Standards on Dangerous Individuals and Organizations, thereby repermitting
posts promoting hate speech and harmful misinformation.36
Still, as larger platforms slowly progress in their willingness to moderate
content on their sites, studies suggest that alt-leaning individuals, groups and
organizations are migrating to smaller social media-based messaging platforms
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such as Telegram, Epik, and Parler, where extreme ideologies can continue to
polarize, becoming a greater threat to individuals and society.37
Whether these responses are viewed as necessary or overreaching, social
media companies are ineffective in rooting out users and content detrimental to
society. Further, some companies continue to demonstrate an unwillingness to
take any action, instead invite and promote users and content creating the type of
consternation discussed here.
Recognition of a Growing Threat
The government and other experts are also recognizing a need for broader
response. In responding to questions regarding adversary threats during his
confirmation hearing, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated, “Russia has
threatened U.S. democratic processes and exerted malign influence on the world
stage,” adding Russia and other actors will continue to use cyber and information
operations to target democratic institutions and exploit our divisions.38 He also
noted, “violent extremist organizations continue to pose a threat to U.S. interest;
radical ideology across the internet has expanded the reach of fringe groups,
threatening the homeland and inciting violence…”39
Recently, the Executive and Legislative Branches attempted to address the
polarization of individuals over social media. The Honest Ads Act, designed to
prevent foreign interference in elections and improve transparency of online
political advertising, stalled in the 115th and 116th Congress.40 Executive Order
13925 was written to prevent social media companies from censoring online
content, however legal experts suggest the order is largely unenforceable as social
media companies remain private enterprises.4142
Subject matter experts are also speaking out against social media
companies as they are the sole adjudicates determining content and user reach.43
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Other researchers write, “[the] exploitation of social media platforms is an
important regulatory question for government and the private sector.”44 Adding,
“while some extremists end up barred at the discretion of hosting platforms,”
responding to extremism on social media requires a balance between stakeholders
and the regulation/moderation across platforms, “conscious of rights to free
expression and the appropriateness of restrictions on speech.”45
Due to its global reach, impacts and capabilities, social media policy must
be further examined. Analysis shows social media legislation is warranted due to
dangers associated with its current use; a tool capable of inflicting harm, damages,
and causalities (physical and emotional), and able to bypass, usurp and dismantle
the principles upon which the United States was founded.
Recommendations for Analysis and Policy Direction
To address many of the issues and concerns presented throughout this
paper, more research is being done to formulate appropriate response options.
Some of the notable discussions include:
•
•
•

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 – Review to
determine its appropriateness to the current informational environment.46
Mandated self-regulation – Establish stable and coherent norms across
social media companies, including rationales for action and intervention.47
Digital Literacy Campaigns – Adult and childhood education programs to
develop the critical skills to work, learn and socialize in a digital world.48

Studies will continue to research, refine, and recommend solutions within these
frameworks. However, as policy options are further developed, the threat to the
nation is grows, and social media is playing an overly active role.
Justifying Policy Options
Under the U.S. Constitution, the foremost obligation of government is to
preserve and protect the Union. Liberty University’s Professor of Government,
Dr. Kahlib Fischer, writes, “God has commissioned governing authorities to
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primarily protect the citizens under their care; it is a God-given mandate for civil
authorities to fight against unjust aggressors.”49 Additionally, We the People
possess inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property, rights which cannot be
given nor taken away, to which government exists to protect.50
The First Amendment (Counter) Argument
Before policy options can be discussed, the primary challenge to any
government involvement, the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, must
be addressed. Many constitutional scholars, media experts, analysts and field
professionals maintain there can never be enough speech, or the answer to false
speech is more speech or counterspeech.51 Others maintain, speech alone, no
matter how hateful, does not violate the rights of others.52
Recent studies suggest government has taken a laissez-faire approach in
examining free speech in an effort to avoid overreach, neglecting its
responsibilities as a government. As all branches of government consider whether
or not to punish or censure information characterized as false, they fear they may
inadvertently restrict truth or free speech.53 Consequently, as in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, government gives credibility to fake news (which can lead to
harm and injury), granting liability protections to false claims, establishing
dangerous precedence.54
On the original intent of free speech, legal scholar Richard Epstein states,
“the theory of freedom not only grants rights to individuals, but it also insists that
there are correlative duties associated with those rights.”55 He adds, the concept of
freedom, including freedom of speech, as the Founding Fathers envisioned based
on philosophical influences of the time, a person is permitted to do what they will
unless they use force, threaten force, or misrepresent another to achieve their
purpose.56 In such cases, when appropriately applying the intended principles of
the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech clause, government may prohibit
misrepresentation or restrict speech if usage can lead to harm, injury or action.57
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The Right to User Data as Property
However, as discussed, social media companies utilize platform
algorithms fed by individual user data, personal and private information, designed
to pool, target, and manipulate users into truncated interface loops that limit one’s
exposure to “counterspeech” or other content that algorithmic programming
determines would likely remove the user from the market.58
As noted, social media platforms are not just communications companies,
they are advertising agencies providing user data for targeted engagements by
advertisers, adversaries, extremists, or other actors.59 Generally, users are unaware
their data is being collected, let alone used for targeting. Therefore, discussions
should not center solely around the topic of free speech, rather how social media
companies are marketing user data in a manner that allows intelligence-based
algorithms, or similar programs to exploit and manipulate the user experience.
This discussion would consider if users have a right to their digital data, as they
do with other personal property, and should it be protected as such. Philip Napoli,
Professor of Public Policy at Duke University, shares that the notion of “you own
your own data” is gaining momentum.60
Although there is a personal responsibility in limiting the type of data
shared with social media platforms, studies suggest that social media companies
should be treated as other information fiduciaries, maintaining strict privacy
policies similar to those in legal and medical industries with strict attorney-client
and doctor-patient confidentiality limitations.61 “Privacy protects us from other
harms such as discrimination, public shame and reputational damage. It
contributes to autonomy by giving us enough physical and mental space to be
ourselves and to develop our views without undue external influence.”62
Given the current state of Congressional affairs, in which there is little
traction moving legislative or regulatory measures forward to address these
issues, the concept of user data rights is recommended for further research and
analysis.63 Foreign adversaries, domestic extremists, and other actors have
demonstrated a capability and capacity to divide society, undermine the rule of
law, and weaken democracy through the malign usage of user data. Policy
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makers, legislatures, and relevant stakeholders need to consider that individuals
have a right to their digital data. If government exists to protect inalienable rights,
including property rights, a framework for responsible government action could
be established, one in which data rights are better protected from nefarious actors.
Mitigating the Dangers of Social Media Technology
In the U.S., other innovations, scientific advancements, and medical
breakthroughs are limited by policy or regulation because of the real and
unmitigated threats they pose to life and society. Should similar frameworks be
considered when looking at social media?
Social media is arguably the most powerful technology ever created.64
Sadly, it can, and has been weaponized by individuals, non-state and state actors.
Mark Zuckerberg writes, “companies such as Facebook face sophisticated, wellfunded adversaries who are getting smarter over time. It’s an arms race; it will
take the combined forces of the U.S. private and public sectors to protect
America’s democracy from outside interference.”65
During the formative years of nuclear technology, regulations were
enacted to encourage the technology’s development for the benefit of civil
society, to protect the public’s health and safety from the hazards its use, and to
demonstrate its promise as an innovative technology.66 However, due to the
potential for harm when mishandled or weaponized, regulatory actions were taken
to correct deficiencies and establish a grand strategy to ensure safe usage.67
Additionally, “vaccines are one of the most significant achievements of
science and public health.”68 The positive benefits of this technology to mankind
are unmistakable. Yet, regulations are permissible, as they ensure public safety,
and help identify misuse from nefarious actors, such as terrorist.69 As a result,
there is generally a global consensus to regulatory frameworks in the interest of
protecting the public.
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Not many would present that social media offers zero benefit to society. It
has expanded opportunities in the U.S., toppled dictators internationally, and
broadcast evil doings globally.70 However, actors are increasingly capable of
entering the digital battlefield and using the munitions of weaponized social
media platforms to manipulate, corrupt, and grow disdain for one another and
democratic society.71
For this reason, policy makers need to acknowledge the cognitive and
physical threats stemming from social media, and also recognize that social media
companies might be more responsive to developing solutions if they had
normative ethical and social responsibilities to the provision of content, and not a
singular focus on generating growth, users and profits.
Conclusion
Social media is a growing existential threat. Still, many in the U.S. fail to
recognize it for the massive challenge it is.72 It is incumbent upon responsible
statesmen to advocate for solutions that maximize liberties and rights, while
maintaining and protecting society and the nation. Examining social media usage
and policies provides evidence of government and society being fractured. “Social
media companies have become active players in digital war.”73 User data can be
leveraged by others with almost no regard to risk. Battlegrounds of aggression are
being created at the expense of user wellbeing and societal values. In recent
memory, the sharing of opinions over social media was only encouraged, and
users sought connections to build network and bridge communities.
However, as highlighted, shared content is increasingly false, misleading,
manipulated, and amplified by platform algorithms, foreign adversaries, domestic
extremists and other actors. As a consequence, online content, especially
polarizing content, is leading to more and more offline actions, causing harm and
injury to people, communities, and democracy. Users, policy makers, and
technology companies have a covenantal responsibility to take action, limit the
threat, protect the people, and preserve the nation. Be warned, maintaining the
status quo may further break the nation. And sadly, “[a] broken democracy is, by
definition, debilitated in terms of effectively formulating and implementing the
policy solutions necessary to fix itself.”74
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